A review of World Order by Dr. Henry Kissinger
Readers
of Henry Kissinger’s new book, World
Order, will find a volume that is both descriptive and prescriptive, as
they follow the author along on his exploration of the regional dynamics and
cultural forces which have shaped the political development of individual
countries and the relations between them, across a broad swath of the globe. Delving
into the origins of the Westphalian system, the author provides an engaging
explanation of how and why this particular system of diplomacy and political
development was well-suited to Europe in the period following the Dark Ages,
embraced by a world in which the desire to expand and control territory was
countered by the fear of one’s own neighbors attempting the same. As the author
notes, the importance of the Treaty of Westphalia can be found in the fact that, "The state, not the empire, dynasty, or religious confession, was
affirmed as the building block of European Order. The concept of state
sovereignty."
This key idea - the view of the state as its own, independent body, not subject
to the whims or dictates of a larger power - comes up repeatedly throughout
this book, and serves as a foil against which the author looks at other international
systems and concepts of the nation state. Structurally, it's a useful starting
point for English-speaking readers in the West who are likely to come to this
volume with a greater degree of familiarity with the main ideas underpinning
this system, in practice if not in name.
As the author goes on to explore other concepts of political self-identity and
points of friction between various nations and empires, having this explanation
of Westphalian ideals as a reference point is very useful. This is certainly
the case as he looks at the rise of China, Iran and Russian as individual
states and of the Ottoman Empire as the embodiment of a distinct,
religiously-inspired enterprise, possessed of an intensely monolithic
worldview.
In light
of this I think his analysis of the evolution of these political entities is
useful in at least two ways: it reminds us that conflicting world views have
pretty much always existed between different groups, and that inevitably,
cultural misunderstandings will occur when one or more such group comes into
conflict. Furthermore, given the tension that exists today between the U.S. and
Russia (as well as Iran and China) knowing a little more about how the leaders
of these countries see the world and their place in it, can only be a good
thing.
That being said, I could not help get the feeling as I read the book that the
author has essentially divided nations into two camps, the first composed of those
which have traditionally seen themselves as one nation among many, part of a
larger system that benefits individual countries by placing the long-term
stability of the collective body ahead of parochial interest. Such nations, as
the author sees them, have sought to maintain a regional balance of power by
checking the aggression of neighbors and attempting to avoid conflicts that
threaten to fundamentally alter the system so as to provide one nation the
chance to dominate all the others. The other camp is the province of nations or
empires who are unfailingly convinced of their own superiority in virtually every
sphere of life, and act accordingly on the world stage. Although wars are
certainly fought between nations in the first group, the goal is not the
complete destruction of the enemy; for
nations in the second category, nothing short of ceaseless expansion, influence
and control will satisfy.
The
author also divides nations into another dyad, separating those for whom
practical interest of the country come first, from those which place values and
ideals at the center of their own foreign policy. It is the second group which
Kissinger seems most critical of, outlining the evolution of American diplomacy
in the early twentieth century and portraying President Woodrow Wilson’s desire
to achieve a new world order based on the idea that all future armed conflicts
might be prevented through dialogue as naïve. One of the flaws that the author
sees in this way of looking at the world is that it produces its own kind of
absolutism, requiring every other nation (even those with a decidedly imperial
outlook, in this case Germany) to completely embrace this new model.Kissinger
points to this attitude on the part of Wilson as particularly damaging, suggesting that it inadvertently led to an
extension of hostilities in WWI as the American president held out for the
complete surrender of the Kaiser before he would seriously engage in a peace
process with Germany. Kissinger is even more critical of the long-term impact
of Wilson’s diplomatic idealism, writing:
“The concept of transcending war
by giving each nation a state, similarly admirable as a general concept, faced
analogous difficulties in practice. Ironically, the redrawing of Europe’s map
on the new principle of linguistically based national self-determination,
largely at Wilson’s behest, enhanced Germany’s geopolitical prospects.”
Given
this, and many other examples one could draw from reading World Order, it’s hard not
to get the impression that Kissinger sees foreign policy which acts solely on
the basis of ideology, and without concern for history or context, to be quite
damaging. I am inclined to agree that these other two elements should be
considered, but I do take issue with the idea that we cannot let our better
angels serve as signposts, if not guides, in how we conduct ourselves in the
world.
This
friction can be seen today in many places, but one spot on the globe where this
tension between systems has persisted at a structural level is the Middle East.
Kissinger describes the imposition of the Westphalian system on this region as
particularly insidious. I am inclined to agree that some of the problems which
have persisted in the last 100 years in this area can be traced back to the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and to the European instinct to construct new
states, sometimes based on historical claims and often out of whole cloth,
following the end of World War I.
These
events set up a major tension between the idea of secular states and the
previously dominant notion of a vast world-wide caliphate, or Islamic state,
previously under the guidance and protection of the Ottomans. Furthermore, the
introduction of this system flew in the face of political norms the Ottomans
had established in their own relations with Europe, which had emphasized the
subordination of European rulers, including royalty, to the Sultan. Kissinger
sees this conflict playing out today between Israel and its neighbors, writing:
“The conflict of two concepts of
world order is embedded in the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Israel is by
definition a Westphalian state, founded as such in 1947(sic); the United
States, its principal ally, has been a steward and key defender of the
Westphalian international order. But the core countries and factions in the
Middle East view international order to a greater or lesser extent through an
Islamic consciousness.”
This is
an astute observation, but it begs the question as to how this view can help
advance the cause of peace. This is not Kissinger's question, per se, but it is
one of mine – explication has value to be sure, but is there a useful or
positive takeaway from seeing the conflict through this lens? After all, the
idea that Israel, a technologically advanced democracy which maintains good
relations with the West, embraced a different founding ethos than other states
in the Middle East, is not all that surprising. Later Kissinger writes:
“…the issue comes down to the
possibility of coexistence between two concepts of world order – through two
states – Israel and Palestine – in the relatively narrow space between the
Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.”
This
idea fits neatly with the overarching theme of the book, and Kissinger has
identified one root cause of this conflict and its apparent intractability, but
it also leaves out any mention of the complex and often violent history between
Israel and Palestinian terror groups over the past 60-odd years, not to mention
the constraints that leaders have faced on both sides, imposed by their
respective peoples. True, Kissinger has not set out to provide a lengthy
treatise on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but differing worldviews are not,
in my opinion, the one key obstacle to peace. The divide between how Israelis
and Palestinians see the world is worth considering, but there are far more
significant factors preventing peace, including continued attacks orchestrated by
Hamas and Hezbollah, not to mention an extraordinary level of dysfunction
within the Palestinian political leadership.
One
place where I think Kissinger could have done more was in his exploration of
the influence of non-state actors on both individual societies and
international relations. He does not ignore their presence or their role, but
as a reader I would have liked to have had a more thorough examination of how
these groups are interacting with the other political systems he describes in
the book. Kissinger plays around the margins of this topic, noting the role
that Afghanistan played as a safe-haven for Al-Queda and mentions the growing influence
of ISIS and the broader threat is poses, but does not offer substantive
suggestions as to how this threat can or should be addressed.
Overall,
Kissinger has written a useful, interesting book that looks at different ways nation-states
and empires have developed over time. By
devoting pages to India, China, Russia, the US and Europe, he presents an
overview of the main actors on the world stage at the moment, and provides a
succinct summary of the evolution of political thought within each of them. Ultimately
the picture that emerges from his prose is one of a world divided, where the
principle entities are tightly bound by occasionally misguided, if
well-intentioned, ideas about their own identity and role to play in the world.
It is in these miscalculations that folly (or worse) lies, Kissinger would have
us believe, and I think he is at least partly correct. It is not hard to see
how inherently different worldviews contributed to friction between the Ottoman
Empire and Europe from the Great Britain in the 17th century onward,
between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War or between
America and Iran today – the question I had after reading this book, though,
was how terrorist groups and other movements may influence such ideological
conflicts today in ways that could have a very real outcome in this young
century. Each nation and alliance of nations will surely continue to make foreign
policy in ways that furthers their own interests, but more and more these
non-state actors may influence that decision making. But perhaps that is a
topic better addressed in Kissinger’s next book.
Copyright Daniel E. Levenson 2014.